I believe though that given the current context there are some minor amendments and additions that would be worthwhile.
The use of the term Department of health (DH) should be amended to read as Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) . this change took place in 2018 and therefore deserves to be recognised.
The context within which the paper sits may be enhanced by reference to the regulatory journey that has taken place from 2002 following the Milburn "Dissolution of the Health Authorities" which replaced the disparate 100 HAs by 28 Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs). In quick succession from 28 in 2002 to 10 (quasi regions) in 2006 to be replaced by 4 (North, South, Midlands and East of England) in 2010; during this time the move from PCGs to a reduced number of PCTs should be recognised. The resulting reduction in regulatory bodies was then replaced by the Lansley Moment which brought into place the profusion effect of the CCG and the Area's within Regions under the control of the David Nicholson at the NHS Commissioning Board.
The authors should be congratulated on selecting a topic of significant importance for both contemporary patient quality and safety research and with potential practical benefit for both government, regulatory agencies, stakeholders and other participants in the delivery of healthcare services in the NHS.
The authors define "patient safety regulation" -the central phenomenon of interest -as directed at ensuring "…safe, reliable treatment for patients and a safe working environment for healthcare professionals" whilst providing "potentially valuable feedback to provider organisations, supporting improvement and ensuring that high standards of performance are maintained". Given this definition and aim, the authors rightly note the criticism of patient safety regulation regarding effectiveness, inflexibility and forms of undesirable compliance behaviours that some writers have argued it can create. Noting that there is a tradition of criticism of patient safety regulation, the authors -rightly in my view -propose that an understanding of the regulatory landscape is required prior to engaging in question of critique or reform.
The method selected by the authors is appropriate for the purposes outlined by them. The results they report are clearly communicated in a step-wise manner. However, there are a number of importantand some essential -areas where the authors might revise their paper prior to publication. In particular, these relate to areas where the authors should provide more clarity as to (a) the scope and meaning of important concepts and assumptions that drive this research, and, perhaps most importantly, (b) where they must exercise more restraint in constructing conclusions that are supportable by the data, literature and argument presented in the paper.
For the reasons outlined below, I believe that the paper should be published subject to some selected revisions and copy editing. I provide commentary below on some important areas for the authors to consider in their revision process.
1.
The authors must provide a revised statement of what they mean by "regulation" at an earlier phase of the paper. Whilst there is a statement developed at 7 of the review draft, the definition lacks any obvious connection to the wider and more developed regulatory theory literature, and suffers for it. Without a more robust definition questions arise as to why, for example, the authors constrained their inquiry to "organisations"?; does their definition of "organisation" include important Offices (in the sense of a public function) such as that of the Coroner?; Why are only domestic "organisations" reviewed -what of transnational, European or global regulatory bodies? These questions are listed here merely as guidance. I do not believe the authors must answer these either in responses or revision. They are offered simply to illustrate what a more robust definition might provide the paper. Naturally, the authors might wish to argue that the existing definitions of "regulation" offered by that literature are insufficient for their purposes. If that is the case, then this should be clearly stated with reasons provided. 2.
Related to point [1] above, the authors should revise the description of regulation and regulatory activity provided in the pages leading to 7. In particular, the authors should provide a clear rationale for confining the review to NHS regulation, rather than health services regulation more broadly (that is, including private sector provision etc). Moreover, the discussion in that section seems to conceive of regulation by way of a focus upon the practices of external inspection and "true external oversight" as the authors put it. This is particularly pronounced in the brief historical overview where the authors argue that "broad sectors of the NHS remained free of external oversight or regulation throughout [the period until the late 1990"s]". However, this conflicts with what I read the authors" intention/view of regulation provided at 7. This is particularly true where the earlier text conflates or limits its discussion of "regulation" to matters of "external oversight" including inspection, and as a practice carried out by government or, alternatively, governmentestablished regulatory bodies in this earlier part of the paper. The authors should adjust their introductory materials to make clear their broader understanding of regulation. This confusion as between the definition of regulation provided at 7 and the material given beforehand -which focuses only on external and governmental regulation -demonstrates the potential contribution that a more robust definition of regulation might perform here. Regulation, as understood by much of the regulatory theory literature takes a "broad view", see especially authors like Julia Black et al and others who draw their lineage from the Responsive Regulation theories of Braithwaite et al.
3.
Given my comments at [1] and [2] , the authors must more clearly delineating the scope of their review throughout. This is largely a drafting/re-drafting exercise. It may mean that the authors choose to state their focus as being something more closely resembling a review of formal, governmental and quasigovernmental regulation rather than "regulation" in its broad meaning. This is particularly important for statements like "[w]e aim to map the landscape of patient safety regulation in the NHS and understand the totality of influences on NHS Trusts." Whilst this may be true of a broader project, this paper"s important work is to make a more focused contribution.
4.
The authors should revise their interpretation of the multitude of regulatory actors throughout, especially in the discussion and interpretation sections. For example, the authors write that " [t] he multitude of organisations that are simultaneously involved in various types of activities overseeing healthcare is striking". It is true that there are a multitude of organisations that are involved. And the large number of them may well be "striking" in some ways, and to some sector participants -perhaps especially patients. However, the broader healthcare regulatory literature already documents, in multiple contexts, the existence of such multitudinous and overlapping regulatory actors and influences on health care practice and service delivery. See in particular the work of Judith Healy (see especially, Improving health care safety and quality: reluctant regulators. Routledge, 2016.), Healy and other"s work on polycentric and responsive regulatory nature of healthcare globally, the work of Alan Merry and Alexander McCall Smith on criminal and other legal influences followed by the work of Oliver Quick.
5.
The authors rightly detect the important role of "other" bodies or organisations in the regulatory mix. However, given their particular nature (i.e. as not self-consciousness "regulatory") the authors should consider and account for the complex relationship and difficulties as between these regulatory actors roles and responsibilities as they interact with their regulatory influence. For example, what might the "other" roles of the Royal Colleges and others play in relation to patient safety regulation? 6.
The authors rightly conclude that there is both a proliferation of regulatory actors. To this, they provide a limited review of existing literature on the views and experiences of regulatees. However, given the limited and selective engagement with that literature the authors must treat any conclusions they draw from this literature with more restraint by revising their wording. For example, the authors write that some regulatees are reported to have "found inspection processes burdensome, particularly as a result of large-scale and incoherent information requests from the overseeing agency." However, the conclusion that seems to be drawn here is one that gestures towards the source of this reported difficulty being the proliferation of regulatory actors ("bewildering range of disparate organisations and agencies"). This is an inappropriate conclusion to draw from this data without more data or appropriate argument. Conclusions of this nature, and this is not the only one, must be revised. For one, the authors do not consider -at least within the text -that the attitude of regulatees might well not be impartial. Rather, they seem in their current drafting to uncritically accept the attitude expressed by regulatees as both normatively justified and warranted in the circumstances. It will, of course, be of little surprise to the authors that regulatees often resent the imposition of regulation, and regulatory activities upon their work. However, such resentment must be placed within the context of the interests inherent in the regulator/regulatee relationship and then tested by further research. In this particular instance, a more appropriate conclusion might be to interpret the reported lack of coordination of regulatory actors, and the reported low quality of their request processes and to raise the hypothesis/question as to whether a part of this reported dissatisfaction by regulatees is due to the proliferation of regulatory actors. This should be done whilst noting the source of complaint being the regulatee -all of which is perhaps a prompt for further research on the part of the authors.
Other examples of similar conclusions that must be revised include but are not limited to: a.
In the structured abstract, "continual regulatory requests and visits distract and impede locally driven initiatives to improve safety and quality…": the authors do not provide sufficient evidence to support this claim of either "continual" requests, their distraction/impeding of local activities, their less effective nature than local activites etc. b.
"However the overall impact of the totality of the regulatory system makes it impossible for regulators to act effectively and places a massive burden on NHS providers which almost certainly detracts from safety and quality improvement initiatives": the authors must revise this statement which is not sufficiently supported by the methods or evidence presented by the paper; c.
"…major simplification of the current system which in turn could produce huge savings and more effective regulation": such a "major simplification" may well produce savings. However, the authors must revise and reframe this statement so that it accords with the evidence presented in the paper. d.
"unwittingly devoted to regulation" (see [9] below for example).
7.
Related to my commentary at [6] and elsewhere the authors should consider whether their approach to regulation and regulators is sufficiently critical, especially with regards to their own preconceptions of regulatory actors, regulatory activities and the effect on regulatees. For example, in their description of regulatory actors presenting health and hospital services with "large-scale and incoherent information requests from the overseeing agency" that were interpreted as "burdensome", the authors should exercise more critical distance from the claims of regulatees. Whilst regulatory actors may well impose requests that are interpreted as burdensome, this does not mean that they are not warranted nor justified. Moreover, the drafting at present seems to develop an unquestioned contrast between regulatory actors that make "largescale and incoherent" requests and hospital and health services who are the victim of such burdensome requests. There are no doubt improvements to be made, however, such a contrast occludes the long history of health services producing unsafe or low-quality health services, the history of intentional or reckless evasion of regulatory oversight and I think unfairly characterises regulatory actors -and not health or hospital services -as the only producer of incoherence or burdensomeness in the execution of their work. I trust the authors do not regard this as mere "nit-picking", but rather as a provocation to push their important analysis and research further by adopting a more critical stance as to this field in both their paper and future work.
8.
In the conclusory sections of the paper, the authors introduce the question of the financial cost of regulatory action. The authors must provide significant, further consideration and evidence regarding cost or significantly revise this discussion. It appears as if "out of nowhere" at present, and is not currently supported by the data/method undertaken in the paper or their engagement with the existing literature. The paper reports on a review of regulatory organisations, not their cost of operating, the cost of compliance or the cost-benefit of both. An important, but subsidiary, question arises as to "why financial costs" which likely means that a focus on cost is not suitable in this particular paper: What about other reasons for regulation -democratic control, monitoring of public expenditure and exercise of power? How can a claim be adequately supported in the context of the current paper that "major simplification of the current system which in turn could produce huge savings and more effective regulation"? These claims are simply not supported by the paper as it stands -either by collection and mobilisation of data or attendant argument.
9.
The authors conclude that parts of the NHS budget may well be "unwittingly devoted to regulation". This will likely be true. However, the authors should consider what they include in the scope of this claim: does it include the development, dissemination and implementation of evidence-based medicine and other standards that various of the regulatory actors they identify use to influence the "flow of events"? What of other forms of regulatory activity that would be included in the definition of 'regulatory' or 'regulation' adopted and developed by colleagues such as Black or Braithwaite?
Finally, related to my points at [7] , [8] and elsewhere, the authors must consider the counter-factual: that the various bodies, their multiplicity, overlapping jurisdictions and particular practices either in whole or in part contribute to patient safety. This is the obvious counter-factual that must be considered by the authors, and attending to the possibility that some or all of the regulatory actors and practices they map might in fact make a contribution will work to temper some of the conclusions they draw in this draft and I hope provide a suitable foil to the adoption of an uncritical perspective on regulation in this field.
It might well be that none or many of the regulatory actors and their practices in fact contribute positively to patient safety. Alternatively, it might be that the contribution currently made by a conglomeration of many actors might be made as well or more efficiently (economically or otherwise) by fewer actors. However, at present, the paper as drafted presents evidence as to the regulatory landscape, supported by a selected and brief consideration of some existing literature. Subject to my comments it performs this task well, and for that reason should be published following revisions. However, the paper does not report nor engage with data or sufficient argument regarding the financial cost of regulation (including attendant costbenefit analysis), nor an evaluation of regulatory practice, nor a critical review of regulatory systems design. That is, whilst it makes a series of claims regarding regulation, at present the drafting simply claims them without directly mounting an argument or providing justification for such claims contrary to the counter-factual raised above.
Rather, it engages in an important critical, interpretative mapping of regulatory organisations and their mechanisms of influence on the NHS. Until and unless the paper or further research engages with the broader/other aspects of the regulation of patient safety, the authors should continue to draw appropriately circumspect conclusions and recommendations based on the evidence they have amassed. This is not to say that the authors should not argue for regulatory reform -even radical reform. They are well placed to do so and I hope that the programme of further research that they gesture towards develops the much needed evidence for constructing and assessing such proposals.
VERSION 1 -AUTHOR RESPONSE
Mapping the regulatory landscape of the NHS
Reviewers' Comments
Revisions Summary/Notes/Actions
Reviewer 1
This review from the Oxford Group led by Charles Vincent correctly identifies the concerns relating to the burden of regulation that may be seen to exist across the NHS in England. They have carried out an exhaustive trawl of those organisations and bodies that may be seen to have a role in regulating, advising and planning the current healthcare system in England.
Thank you. The process was indeed exhaustive and indeed exhausting but it also gave us an insight into how difficult it is for anyone or any organisation to fully understand this landscape Thank you for these helpful suggestions. We have added two paragraphs to show that the evolution of regulation in the NHS, which we had described, needs to be seen in the context of these wider organisational and structural changes. We also include the more recent developments stemming from the 5 year Forward View. The authors present a paper that reports on a desktop mapping exercise aimed at what they term the "regulatory landscape" for patient safety in the NHS. The authors should be congratulated on selecting a topic of significant importance for both contemporary patient quality and safety research and with potential practical benefit for both government, regulatory agencies, stakeholders and other participants in the delivery of healthcare services in the NHS.
Thank you for appreciating the work to map the regulatory landscape and the potential benefits stemming from the mapping for developing and improving regulation in various practical ways.
1. The authors must provide a revised statement of what they mean by "regulation" at an earlier phase of the paper. Whilst there is a statement developed at 7 of the review draft, the definition lacks any obvious connection to the wider and more developed regulatory theory literature, and suffers for it. Without a more robust definition questions arise as to why, for example, the authors constrained their inquiry to "organisations"?; does their definition of "organisation" include important Offices (in the sense of a public function) such as that of the Coroner?; Why are only domestic "organisations" reviewed -what of transnational, European or global regulatory bodies? These questions are listed here merely as guidance. I do not believe the authors must answer these either in responses or revision. They are offered simply to illustrate what a more robust definition might provide the paper. Naturally, the authors might wish to argue that the existing definitions of "regulation" offered by
As noted above we were indeed influenced by regulatory theory and have now added a section (see below) which we hope has provided a clearer rationale for the how we interpreted the organisations we should review. We agree it would also be possible to look more widely (European etc) but this was simply beyond the scope of this study -which was a mammoth exercise in itself.
The method selected by the authors is appropriate for the purposes outlined by them. The results they report are clearly communicated in a step-wise manner.
We again appreciate the comments on the purpose and value of the study. We have also taken note of your comments below about potentially unwarranted criticism of regulation. At various points we have adjusted the text to give a more balanced approach to the benefits and costs of regulation.
There are a number of important -and some essential -areas where the authors might revise their paper prior to publication. In particular, these relate to areas where the authors should provide more clarity as to (a) the scope and meaning of important concepts and assumptions that drive this research, and, perhaps most importantly, (b) where they must exercise more restraint in constructing conclusions that are supportable by the data, literature and argument presented in the paper.
Thank you for drawing our attention to these issues. We had previously reviewed the theoretical background and were indeed influenced by these wider formulations in our approach to the study. However, we had been unsure whether to add such material into the paper. Very happy to do so (see below). We also appreciate that we should be more careful in our interpretation of the findings and their implications and have made various adjustments (see below).
that literature are insufficient for their purposes. If that is the case, then this should be clearly stated with reasons provided.
2. Related to point [1] above, the authors should revise the description of regulation and regulatory activity provided in the pages leading to 7. In particular, the authors should provide a clear rationale for confining the review to NHS regulation, rather than health services regulation more broadly (that is, including private sector provision etc). Moreover, the discussion in that section seems to conceive of regulation by way of a focus upon the practices of external inspection and "true external oversight" as the authors put it. This is particularly pronounced in the brief historical overview where the authors argue that "broad sectors of the NHS remained free of external oversight or regulation throughout [the period until the late 1990"s]". However, this conflicts with what I read the authors" intention/view of regulation provided at 7. This is particularly true where the earlier text conflates or limits its discussion of "regulation" to matters of "external oversight" including inspection, and as a practice carried out by government or, alternatively, government-established regulatory bodies in this earlier part of the paper. The authors should adjust their introductory materials to make clear their broader understanding of regulation. This confusion as between the definition of regulation provided at 7 and the material given beforehand -which focuses only on external and governmental regulationdemonstrates the potential contribution that a more robust definition of regulation might perform here. Regulation, as understood by much of the regulatory theory literature takes a "broad view", see We have redrafted and simplified the entire discussion. We have made it clear that leading regulatory authors have previously commented on the existence of a multitude of organisations, overlapping activity and so on. We have clarified that our particular contribution is to actually document the full landscape (as best we could) and provide a more solid empirical base both for the observations of other authors and for future actions.
5. The authors rightly detect the important role of "other" bodies or organisations in the regulatory mix. However, given their particular nature (i.e. as not self-consciousness "regulatory") the authors should consider and account for the complex relationship and difficulties as between these regulatory actors roles and responsibilities as they interact with their regulatory influence. For
We agree that this is an important issue but feel it is beyond the scope of the paper and beyond the scope of our study. We do not feel the findings of our study really shed direct light on this issue and so any comments we might add would really just be speculation. example, what might the "other" roles of the Royal Colleges and others play in relation to patient safety regulation?
6. The authors rightly conclude that there is both a proliferation of regulatory actors. To this, they provide a limited review of existing literature on the views and experiences of regulatees. However, given the limited and selective engagement with that literature the authors <b>must</b> treat any conclusions they draw from this literature with more restraint by revising their wording. For example, the authors write that some regulatees are reported to have "found inspection processes burdensome, particularly as a result of large-scale and incoherent information requests from the overseeing agency." However, the conclusion that seems to be drawn here is one that gestures towards the source of this reported difficulty being the proliferation of regulatory actors ("bewildering range of disparate organisations and agencies"). This is an inappropriate conclusion to draw from this data without more data or appropriate argument. Conclusions of this nature, and this is not the only one, must be revised. For one, the authors do not consider -at least within the text -that the attitude of regulatees might well not be impartial. Rather, they seem in their current drafting to uncritically accept the attitude expressed by regulatees as both normatively justified and warranted in the circumstances. It will, of course, be of little surprise to the authors that regulatees often resent the imposition of regulation, and regulatory activities upon their work. However, such resentment must be placed within the context of the interests inherent in the regulator/regulatee relationship and then tested by further research. In this particular instance, a more appropriate conclusion might be to interpret the reported lack of coordination of regulatory actors, and the reported low quality of their request processes and to raise the hypothesis/question as to whether a part of this reported dissatisfaction by regulatees is due to the proliferation of regulatory actors. This should be done whilst noting the source of complaint 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
Thank you. We agree that at various points we have gone beyond the findings of the study in our interpretation. We have revised and simplified the discussion considerably and tried to make it clear that our own findings primarily concern identifying the full range of actors. Clearly this has implications for how one approaches assessing both benefits and costs of regulation, but we have framed these observations in a more neutral manner. The following phrases have, for example, been edited out (numbered as mentioned in Reviewer 2"s comments): "bewildering range of disparate organisations and agencies" A.
Abstract: "continual regulatory requests and visits distract and impede locally driven initiatives to improve safety and quality…" B.
"continual" requests, their distraction/impeding of local activities, their less effective nature than local activites etc. "However the overall impact of the totality of the regulatory system makes it impossible for regulators to act effectively and places a massive burden on NHS providers which almost certainly detracts from safety and quality improvement initiatives" C.
"…major simplification of the current system which in turn could produce huge savings and more effective regulation" D. "unwittingly devoted to regulation"
